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Abstract
This paper extends the model of Melitz (2003) to separate the direct and indirect impact
of an export tax rebate on the intensive margin of firm-level export sales at the subnational
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variable costs, while the indirect impact manifests itself through higher regional wages as
a result of increased demand for local labor. First, the empirical results imply that a 1%
rise in the export tax rebate rate increases the export sales among continuing exporters
by 0.4% through the direct channel. Second, the same rebate increase reduces export
sales among continuing exporters by 0.02% through indirect channel. Both effects are
statistically significant, and are consistent with the model’s predictions.
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1. Introduction
Value-added taxes are an indirect tax imposed at each stage of the production
process based on the amount of value added associated production value. Most of
the world’s value-added taxes are imposed only on goods and services consumed
within their own taxing jurisdiction, also known as destination based VAT(Desai
and Hines, 2005). Feldstein and Krugman (1990) show that a destination based
VAT system with a complete tax rebate has no effect on exports and imports.
Therefore, unlike export subsidies and other measures, the VAT rebate (hereafter,
ETR) has been considered to be consistent with the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) main function of ensuring free and smooth trade. According to Bird and
Gendron (2007), until January 2007, at least 150 nations use an ETR regime.
There is a general belief that the ETR rate and firms’ exports are positively cor-
related when the rebate rate is incomplete. A significant number of researches
have found evidence to support this claim (e.g. Chao et al., 2001; Chen et al,,
2006; Chandra and Long, 2013). However, all those papers investigate the direct
effect of ETR on export volume. In our paper, we argue that in addition to direct
effect, the ETR also has an indirect effect on export volume through differential
industrial composition. Without taking the indirect effect into account, researches
will tend to exaggerate the role of the ETR in promoting international trade.
While the direct effect of the ETR on firms’ exports reduces the variable pro-
duction cost, the indirect effect of the ETR arises from competition for local la-
borers among exporting firms. Specifically, when an increase in the ETR makes
exporting more profitable, exporting firms expand their production thus necessitat-
ing the demand for more laborers. This increased demand drives up the laborer’s
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wage. As a consequence, the firm-level output and exports will be depressed.
We develop a theoretical model to illustrate both the direct and indirect mech-
anisms and examine them empirically in this paper. The principal goal of the
theoretical model is to uncover both the direct and indirect effect of the ETR on
firm-level exporting behaviors. In line with most of the recent international trade
literature (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), we assume that labor is the
only input in the production and firms are heterogeneous in their productivity as
in Melitz (2003). Within a country, each region is treated as a subeconomy with
a different industrial distribution of labor. When labor mobility is limited, the
model shows that a nation wide change in the ETR will lead to different firm-level
export responses. Intuitively, if other things are equal, and the ETR changes are
identical in all industries, the wage changes more in regions where more labor work
in the exporting sectors. This implies that the indirect effect is larger in regions
experiencing a larger weighted ETR change.
We evaluate the model’s testable predictions using Chinese Custom data over
2000 to 2006. This data has several significant implications. First, China offers an
ideal setting to investigate the impact of the ETR on firms’ exports. On the one
hand, it has experienced spectacular growth in international trade since the 1980s
(Wang and Wei, 2007), it annually exports the largest volume of products in the
world (Lin, 2010), and its outstanding trade growth has attracted considerable at-
tention because of the trade policies implemented by the Chinese government (e.g.
Eckaus, 2006; Girma et al,, 2009). On the other hand, the Chinese government fre-
quently adjusts the ETR rates to adjust its exports. Gourdon et al. (2014) indicate
that during the 2002 to 2012 period, 87% of products at the HS6-product classi-
fications have undergone at least one ETR change. Second, China’s setting also
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meets our assumption within the theoretical model, since labor mobility between
regions in China is limited. In the era of the planned economy, China introduced
the Residence Registration System (Hukou system) to implement its industrial
development strategy. Under this system, labor mobility is strictly restricted (Cai
et al, , 2002). Although restrictions on labor mobility have gradually relaxed, labor
mobility is still broadly restrained. This fact is helpful for identifying the indirect
effect of the ETR changes on firms’ exports, as exporting firms located in regions,
with different industrial composition respond differently to the same national wide
ETR changes. Third, we also directly observe the HS code of exporting product
and the location of exporting firms in this data set. This feature is essential for us
to construct measures of the industrial and regional ETR rates, respectively.
Endogeneity of the ETR rate is one of the biggest concerns in the empirical
analysis (e.g. Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2014). Specifically, the
ETR rates may be set higher for industries where the majority of firms have high
export growth potential, or set higher for industries where the majority of firms
have poor exporting performance to boost their exports. Either case suggests that
the OLS estimators might be biased. To ease this concern, we take advantage of
China’s dual trade regime to obtain our instrument variable. In China, firms export
under two regimes. One is the “ordinary” regime, which is common throughout
the world. The other is the “processing” regime, under which firms with supplied
materials are not eligible to receive any rebate. Since fiscal pressures are often
the driving force behind the Chinese government for adjusting the ETR rates,
we expect that industries with a larger share of processing trade firms face less
fiscal pressure, and thus resulting in higher ETR rates. Meanwhile, the share
of processing trade within an industry would be independent of firm-level export
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growth. As such, it can be used as an instrument to determine how the ETR affect
firms’ exports.
By using industry-level ETR and regional weighted average ETR to capture
direct and indirect effects, respectively, we find that a 1% increase in the ETR
rate will increase firm-level exports by 0.5%, while a 1% increase in the weighted
average ETR rate will decrease the firm-level exports by 0.2%. After using the
instrument variable and controlling for firm’s self-selection into exporting, we find
that a 1% increase in the ETR rate will increase firm-level exports by 0.2%, and
a 1% increase in the regional weighted ETR rate will decrease firm-level exports
by about 0.02%. These results verify that the OLS estimator tends to be upward
biased. Endogeneity problem should not be ignored when investigating the impact
of ETR on export sales among continuing exporters. The estimated indirect effect
of the ETR is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the
model’s prediction. This result indicates that the direct effect of the ETR on firms’
exports will be offset by the indirect effect caused by local wage changes.
This paper contributes to the literature in two distinct manners. First, we
disentangle both the direct and indirect effect of the ETR on firms’ export sales
among continuing exporters. In theory, Feldstein and Krugman (1990) first point
out that the increase in the ETR rate will lead to the rise of exports. Chen
et al, (2006) develop a Cournot quantity competition model to examine the effect
of the ETR on export performance. Empirically, several papers investigate the
relationship between the ETR rate and export performance at the industrial or
firm level (e.g. Chen et al,, 2006; Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2014).
However, none of them document the role which industrial composition plays in the
implementation of the ETR. Industrial distribution of labor is an essential factor
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affecting exports (Cassey and Schmeiser, 2013; Krautheim, 2012), and failing to
consider it leads to overestimating the importance of the ETR on boosting exports.
Second, this paper also provides some insights into the recent growing body of
work that examines the export spillover effect. For example, Aitken et al (1997)
find that the export probability of Mexican plants is positively related with the
presence of multinational firms in the same state. Greenaway et al, (2004) find
that multinational firms have a positive influence on the export decision of UK
domestic firms. Greenaway and Kneller (2008) show that regional and sectoral
agglomeration encourages the entry of new firms in export markets. However,
Barrios et al (2003), in contrast, find no evidence to indicate that Spanish firms
can benefit from other exporters. Bernard and Jesen (2004) conclude the exporting
spillover effect does not exist among American manufacturing firms. Our paper
which emphasize the competition effect can provide some explanations for these
inconsistent findings. That is, although the presence of other exports can have
positive externality by sharing information, or knowledge spillovers, it also might
exert negative effects on other firms by competing for resources.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the model
and the hypotheses; Section 3 introduces the ETR system in China and separate-
ly identifies its direct and indirect impact on exporting firms’ intensive margin.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
In this section, we develop a model to explain the direct and indirect mecha-
nisms through which the ETR affects firm-level exporting behavior.
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2.1. Labor Supply
Consider a country with many regions, indexed by j. Each industry in this
economy is denoted by i. Labor is the only input in production Labor is assumed
to be mobile between industries, but not across regions. This assumption implies
that the wage level is identical across all industries within a region, but varies
across regions. The labor supply in region j is given by:
Lj = aj + bjωj (1)
where Lj and ωj are labor supply and wages in region j. Note that the elasticity
of labor supply, which is positively correlated with bj,
1 may vary across regions.
Further, assume that production exhibits constant returns to scale. As such,
the marginal production cost for a firm with productivity φk is: MC(φk) =
ω
φk
,
where we have dropped the subscript j for notational convenience.
2.2. Labor Demand
A representative consumer’s preference for varieties takes the CES form.
U =
[∫
ι∈Ω
q(ι)
1−σ
σ dι
] σ
1−σ
(2)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two products.
Firm k in industry i, maximizes its profits by optimally choosing its output,
which determines the firm’s labor demand lki . The labor demand in industry i is
the sum of the individual firms’ labor demand: Li =
∑
k l
k
i . The total regional
1The elasticity of labor supply implies by equation (1)is 1aj
ωbj
+1
.
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labor demand is constituted by the sum of labor demand in each industry
L =
∑
i
Li (3)
where Li is the total labor demand in industry i, which is the aggregate labor
demand of firms in industry i. We further divide labor demand for any export-
ing firm in industry i into domestic and foreign production labor demands. In
particular,
li(ω, φk, ti) = l
ne
i (ω, φk) + l
e
i (ω, φk, ti) (4)
where li(ω, φk, ti) is the labor demand of an exporting firm at wage level ω, ETR
rate ti and productivity φk. l
ne
i (ω, φk) is the labor demand of a firm with produc-
tivity φk, hired to serve the domestic market. l
e
i (ω, φk, ti) is the labor demand of
a firm with productivity φk, hired to serve foreign markets.
2 Therefore, the total
labor demand in industry i of all non-exporting and exporting firms is identical
to the aggregate labor demand of individual firms used to serve the domestic and
foreign markets. That is,
Li =
nnei∑
k=1
lnei (ω, φk) +
nei∑
v=1
lei (ω, φv, ti) (5)
where nnei and n
e
i are the total number of firms serving the domestic market and
foreign markets in industry i, respectively. Note that the labor demand for any
exporting firm has been divided into two parts: one set of labor is hired to serve the
2Note that the ETR rate ti only directly affects the labor demands of exporting firms, used to
serve foreign markets, through changing their variable cost, but does not affect the labor demand
of firms, used to serve the domestic market.
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domestic market, and the other set of labor is hired to serve the foreign markets.
Similar to Melitz (2003), the labor demand of a firm with productivity φk,
hired to serve the domestic market, is given by
lnei (ω, φk) = Ai
(
1
φk
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
ω−σ (6)
where Ai is the domestic residual demand for the products of industry i, respec-
tively.3
Accordingly, the labor demand of an exporting firm with productivity φv, used
to serve the foreign markets, is given by
lei (ω, φv, ti) = A
∗
(
1
φv
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ
where τ˜ =
τ(
1 + τ2
τ
σ
) 1
σi−1
, τ2 = r − ti (7)
where A∗i is the residual demand of products of industry i in foreign markets, r
is the official VAT rate collected, τ2 is the actual VAT rate paid after receiving
the rebate, τ is the iceberg transportation cost, and τ˜ is the rebate adjusted trade
cost.4
2.3. The Impact of the ETR on Exporting Firms’ Intensive Margin
From equation (7), the change in the ETR affects the variable cost of exporting
firms through the adjusted trade cost τ˜ . We can derive the following negative
3Differing from Melitz (2003), we consider the per period fixed cost is paid by using capital
instead of labor to simplify the model. If the per period fixed cost is also considered as a part of
labor demand, the results will not be affected.
4The proof is in the Appendix.
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relationship between the ETR rate, ti, and the adjusted trade cost τ˜ .
∂τ˜
∂ti
=
∂τ˜
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂ti
= τ1
(
− 1
σ − 1
)
(1 + τ2)
− σ
σ−1
(σ
τ
)
< 0. (8)
Equation (8) implies that, an increase in the ETR is identical to a decrease in
rebate adjusted trade cost τ˜ . From this it is evident that we can demonstrate the
following inequalities:
∂lnei (ω, φk)
∂ω
< 0 (9.1)
∂lei (ω, φv, ti)
∂ω
< 0 (9.2)
∂lei (ω, φv, ti)
∂ti
> 0 (9.3)
∂ω
∂ti
> 0 (9.4)
Inequalities (9.1) and (9.2) imply that the labor demand of firms, used to
serve the domestic and foreign markets, is decreasing in the regional wage level ω.
Inequality (9.3) implies that the direct impact of the ETR on exporting firms’ labor
demand, used to serve the foreign markets, is positive. At last, (9.4) indicates the
positive correlation between ETR rate and the regional wage level5. The intuition
for this result is that when industry i receives a higher ETR, exporting firms start
to expand their production, and as such increase the labor demand hired to serve
the foreign markets. All other things equal, the equilibrium wage level increases.
From the above analysis, the ETR affects the firm-level intensive margin of
exports through two respective channels. The first is the direct channel, in which
5The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
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the ETR affects the variable cost of exporting firms through refunding them the
tax they pay. The other is the indirect channel in which the ETR affects the
intensive margin through changing the regional wage. To evaluate the impact of
ETR changes on exporting firms’ behavior, we have to disentangle the direct and
indirect impact of ETR changes.
Regions are heterogeneous in the distribution of labor across industries. The
differences in industrial composition across regions could be caused by regional
level comparative advantages, e.g. geographic or policy advantage (Cai et al, ,
2002). A consequence of different industrial composition across regions is that
the regional wage adjusts differently in response to the ETR changes. This model
yields the following relationship between wage changes and regional level weighted
average ETR changes.
∆ω =
∑
i
βi∆ti (10)
where, βi =
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
b− σ
ω
L
, Lei =
∑
v
lei (ω, φv, ti)
where Lei is the total labor demand of exporting firms hired to serve foreign market-
s, in industry i. Equation (10) implies a positive correlation between the weighted
average ETR change,
∑
i βi∆ti, and the change in the regional wage, ∆ω. βi is
positively correlated with αi =
Lei∑
j Lj
6, the share of laborers in industry i for ex-
port production. We summarize the predictions of the model in the following
proposition.
6βi =
(−σ)τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
b
L− σω
αi
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Proposition 1. When the mobility of the regional labor force is limited, an ETR
increase have a positive direct impact and a negative indirect impact on intensive
margin of firm-level export sales. The impact of industry-level ETR changes on
firm-level exports is smaller in regions experiencing larger weighted average ETR
changes.
The proposition implies that if the ETR changes are identical in all industries,
the intensive margin of exporting firms will change less in regions, where more of
labor is allocated to exporting sectors.
3. Background and Data
In China, industrial composition differs significantly across regions. Candelaria
et al. (2013) show that the regional differences in industrial composition explain
about half of regional wage differences. The ratio of provincial exports to provincial
GDP also varies considerably across provinces. During the period 2002-2006, the
minimum regional export share was less than 5%, while the maximum counterpart
was more than 70%. Table 1 reports the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of export
shares between 2002-2006.
[Table 1 is to be here]
Table 1 indicates significant differences in regional export shares. The data shows
that the maximum regional export share is 20 times larger than the minimum.
These regional differences reflect the regional variation in industrial composi-
tion.7
7The data is available in CEnet Statistics Database: http://db.cei.gov.cn/page/Default.aspx
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Export revenue is an important component in China’s GDP. In 2006, Chinese
export revenue accounted for 37% of GDP. Knowing the important role exports
play in its economy, the Chinese government announced a series of policies to
stimulate exports. ETR system was established to encourage exports. It partially
refunds exporting firms the value-added and consumption tax they pay for their
inputs. In particular, the ETR is applicable for exporting firms engaged in ordinary
trade or processing trade with imported materials. For firms engaged in processing
trade with supplied materials, the value-added tax has already been exempted
when they purchase the inputs, and as such they cannot receive any ETR. The
ETR rates vary substantially across industries with a range from 0 to 17% in 2006.
As a policy tool to adjust the exporting structure (e.g. shifting China’s exports
toward more value-added and high-tech products by providing a high ETR in these
industries), the ETR rate has been frequently adjusted. From 2002 - 2012, more
than 80% of products at 4 digit HS classification level underwent at least one
ETR change. The ETR system has proved effective in boosting exports in China.
Gourdon et al. (2014) show that every 1% increase in the ETR rate in a given
industry causes a 6% increase in export sales in the same industry. In addition,
the Chinese government increased the ETR rates several times when faced with
the East-Asian Crisis in 1997, which stabilized Chinese exports and the economy.
After 1999, a four-tired ETR system (17%, 15%, 13%, and 5%) was implemented
with an average ETR rate of 15%. In October 2003, the Chinese government
announced a reduction in the average ETR rate from 15.11% to 12.11% due to the
fiscal pressure. Since January of 2004, a five-tired ETR system (17%, 13%, 11%,
8%, and 5%) was implemented.
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To conduct the empirical analysis, we match three sources of information. One
of the data sources is collected by the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS)
and contains a report of export quantities, and f.o.b values for exporting firms in
the eight-digit Harmonized System over the 2000-2006 period. The second data
source is from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF). The CASIF
dataset covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs with annual sales
above RMB 5 million, which is equivalent to approximately 700 thousand US
dollars.
We carefully matched the two datasets following Brandt and Zhang (2012) us-
ing firm names, telephone numbers, and zipcodes. Using the matched dataset, we
compute the firm-product level TFP following Foster et al. (2008), and developed
by Hu et al. (2015):
lnTFPikt = ln qikt − αk ln kikt − αl ln likt − αm lnmikt (11)
where qikt is the physical units of output i exported by firm k in year t across all
destinations. kikt, likt and mikt represent the firm-product-year measures of capital,
labor and materials, respectively. αk, αl, and αm are the input share for capital,
labor and intermediate materials, respectively.8
The third data source is the ETR rates from the Chinese Customs Information
Release Center9, which covers all exported products between 2002 - 2006. We
match this dataset with the CCTS data using HS codes. The weighted average
8The detailed procedures of construction input shares is in the Appendix.
9The web page is: http://www.china-customs.com
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ETR in each region is constructed as follows:
ETR provjt =
∑
i
ETRit
expijt
GDPjt
(12)
where ETR provjt is the weighted average ETR of province j in year t, and expijt
is the export revenue of industry i in province j at year t, and GDPjt is the total
GDP of province j in year t. The regional weighted average ETR, ETR provjt,
varies across provinces and over time.
Note that our model is best suited for manufacturing firms which export di-
rectly, but a considerable number of Chinese exporters are intermediary firms.
Following Ahn et al. (2011), we identify the set of intermediary firms by their
name10 and drop all of them in the empirical regressions.
Finally, we have a matched dataset of exporting firms with variables containing
firm-level export quantities and TFP, industry-level ETR rates, and the regional
revenue weighted ETR rates.
3.1. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the model’s prediction of the direct and indirect impact
of the ETR on the firm-level intensive margin of exports. The direct and indirect
effects are captured by the industry-level ETR and regional weighted average ETR,
10Specifically, we identify the set of intermediary firms by their Chinese name that mean “trad-
ing”, “importer”, and “export”. In pinying, the name containing these phrases: “jin4chu1kou3”,
“jing1mao4”, “ke1mao”, and “wai4jing1” is treated as intermediary firms.
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respectively.
lnQkit = β0 + β1 lnETRit + β2 ln (ETR provjt) + β3 lnTFPkt +χt +χi +χk + εkit
(13)
where Qkit is the export units of product i produced by firm k in year t. ETRit
is the ETR rate of industry i in year t, and ETR provjt is the regional revenue
weighted ETR in year t. χt, χi and χk are used to control for the year, industry
and firm fixed effects, respectively. The results are reported in Table 2.
[Table 2 is to be here]
Table 2 indicates that an increase in the industry ETR rate will increase the
intensive margin of exports, while an increase in the regional weighted average
ETR will have the opposite effect. A positive impact of the industry ETR on
firms’ exports captures the impact of the firm-level rebate adjusted trade cost τ˜ ,
defined in equation (7). The negative impact of the weighted average ETR on the
intensive margin of exports captures the impact of changing regional wages. In
particular, the regions experiencing a weighted average ETR increase will expand
their exports and hence raise the regional labor demand. The rising regional labor
demand pushes up the regional wage, which in turn increases the exporting firms’
production cost. As such, a weighted average ETR increase has a negative impact
on firm-level exports. The direct impact of ETR changes on a firm’s exports
dominates the indirect impact. These results are consistent with the model’s
predictions.
As mentioned in a series of papers by Dai et al (2014), Yu (2013) and Gourdon
et al. (2014), processing trade is organized differently from ordinary trade. In
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particular, firms engaged in processing trade are of lower productivity, and rely
more on global supply chains. Most importantly, the processing trade firms with
supplied materials are not qualified to receive the ETR as they are exempted from
paying value added tax when they purchase their inputs. To ease the concern that
the firms engaged in processing trade may potentially bias the empirical results in
Table 2, we estimate the coefficients in equation (13) using only firms engaged in
ordinary trade.
[Table 3 is to be here]
In Table 3, the results show a similar pattern to that in Table 2. Every 1%
increase in industry ETR rate will increase the firm-level intensive margin of export
sales by 0.5%, while every 1% increase in the weighted average ETR rate will
decrease firm-level intensive margin of export sales by about 0.2%.
A second concern arises from reverse causality: the Chinese government may
use the ETR to subsidize poor-performing industries and boost their exports. Al-
ternatively, the ETR may subsidize industries with high export-growth potential.
In either case, our regression framework may potentially suffer from endogeneity
bias. To address this issue we use instrumental variable estimation. During the
2002 - 2006 period, the Chinese government adjusted the ETR rates frequently
because of fiscal pressures (Chandra and Long, 2013). For each industry, the fiscal
pressure partially depends on the share of processing trade firms with supplied
materials, because these firms are not eligible to receive any rebate. This implies
that industries with a larger share of processing trade firms with supplied mate-
rials, will account for less fiscal pressure on the government, and will be subject
to smaller ETR reductions. Meanwhile, the share of processing trade within a
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industry does not affect the firm-level export growth. Therefore, the exporting
share of processing trade with supplied materials in each exporting industry can
be used as an instrument. The results are reported in the second column of Table
4 and Table 5 for the full sample and ordinary trade firms, respectively.
A third concern is selection bias. In particular, all firms experiencing changes
in the intensive margin of export sales are survivors. These firms may have higher
growth potential compared to those firms which exit. This implies that the impact
of the ETR on the firm-level intensive margin of export sales might be upward
biased. To control for the selection bias, we implement the estimation in two steps.
In the first step, we compute the firm-level survival probability using a Probit
regression;11 in the second step, we add the survival probability into equation (13)
and use IV regressions to obtain the final estimates. We report the results with
the selection bias correction in the third column of Table 4 and Table 5 for the full
sample and ordinary trade, respectively.
[Table 4 is to be here]
[Table 5 is to be here]
The results in Table 4 and Table 5 imply that although the impact of the
weighted average ETR on firms’ exports fall, the effect is still negative and sta-
tistically significant after controlling for the endogeneity and selection bias. The
results support the predictions of our model.
11In the selection equation, the selection variables contain firm-level TFP, quantity sales in the
last period and industry-year fixed effect
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the model of Melitz (2003) to investigate the impact
of ETR changes on the firm-level intensive margin of export sales. The model
predicts that an increase in the ETR will have both direct and indirect impacts on
firms’ exports due to the immobility of the regional labor force. On the one hand,
the increase in the ETR decreases firm-level variable costs, and hence increases
firm-level exports. On the other hand, the increase in the ETR increases local
labor demand as production expands among exporting firms. Rising local labor
demand raises the regional wage, which drives up the variable production costs.
As a result, firm-level export volumes decline. Using Chinese firm-level export
data and industry-level ETR rates during the 2002 - 2006 period, we test the
predictions of the model. The results indicate that an increase in the industry-level
ETR increases firm-level exports, while the increase in the weighted average ETR
drives down firm-level exports. The results are robust to controlling for potential
endogeneity and selection bias. This paper suggests that, due to the unbalanced
industrial composition across regions, a national wide ETR policy would have
differential impacts on exports across Chinese provinces.
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Appendix (Tables)
Table 1: The Export Shares in Different Percentiles
Year 25th 50th 75th Min Max
2002 4.07% 5.72% 17.32% 3.20% 73.00%
2003 4.70% 7.10% 18.98% 3.84% 80.30%
2004 5.14% 6.84% 20.48% 4.26% 84.42%
2005 4.80% 7.78% 21.63% 3.53% 87.54%
2006 5.81% 8.39% 24.31% 4.35% 91.61%
Notes: Guandong Province has the largest export share during the period 2002-2003. The inland provinces, e.g.
Henan and Hunan, normally have the lowest export shares.
Table 2: The Impact of ETR on Firms’ Intensive Margin (Full Sample)
lnETRit 0.5540*** 0.5542***
(0.0236 ) (0.0236 )
lnETR provjt -0.1522***
(0.0107 )
lnTFPkt 0.6160*** 0.6160***
(0.0017 ) (0.0017 )
Ownership Yes Yes
R2 0.53 0.53
Obs 1,082,046 1,082,046
Notes: Table 2 presents the impact of ETR on firms’ intensive margin. Industry, year and firm fixed effects have
been included. Standard errors are in parenthesis, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 3: The Impact of ETR on Firms’ Intensive Margin (Ordinary Trade)
lnETRit 0.4668*** 0.4810***
(0.0258 ) (0.0258 )
lnETR provjt -0.2022***
(0.0124 )
lnTFPkt 0.6761*** 0.6762***
(0.0020 ) (0.0020 )
Ownership Yes Yes
R2 0.56 0.56
Obs 777,060 777,060
Notes: Table 3 presents the impact of ETR on ordinary trade firms’ intensive margin. Industry, year and firm fixed
effects have been included. Standard errors are in parenthesis, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 4: The Impact of ETR on Firms’ Intensive Margin (Full Sample-IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.2024*** 0.1540***
(0.0404 ) (0.0415 )
lnETR provjt -0.055*** -0.0129**
(0.0045 ) (0.0046 )
lnTFPkt 0.6420*** 0.7075***
(0.0031 ) (0.0035 )
Ownership Yes Yes
R2 0.47 0.47
Obs 1,082,061 1,082,061
Notes: Table 4 presents the impact of ETR on exporting firms’ intensive margin by using IV regression and
controlling for firms’ exit. Industry, year and firm fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are in
parenthesis, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 5: The Impact of ETR on Firms’ Intensive Margin (Ordinary Trade-IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1350** 0.1879***
(0.0439 ) (0.0465 )
lnETR provjt -0.0579*** -0.0172**
(0.0053 ) (0.0056 )
lnTFPkt 0.6775*** 0.7926***
(0.0036 ) (0.0042 )
Ownership Yes Yes
R2 0.49 0.49
Obs 777,052 777,052
Notes: Table 5 presents the impacts of ETR on ordinary trade firms’ intensive margin by using IV regression
and controlling for firms’ exit. Industry, year and firm fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are in
parenthesis, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Input Shares
We assume that the output of each product is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
function. To compute firm-product level productivity, we need to calculate input
shares for labor, materials and capital, αl, αm and αk, respectively, for each prod-
uct. Let ω˜kt denote firm k’s total nominal wage payments in year t. Hsieh and
Klenow (2008) suggest that the wage bill, ω˜kt tends to underestimate the labor
share in the Chinese manufacturing data. Following their approach, we multiply
each firm’s wage bill by a constant parameter, ρ˜, to inflate the wage bill in each
firm. We determine the size of the constant parameter by choosing the parameter
so that the aggregate labor compensation in the manufacturing sector matches the
labor share in national accounts (roughly 50 percent).
22
Specifically, we denote the total, observed payments to workers as
tω =
∑
k
∑
t
ρ˜ω˜kt = ρ˜
∑
k
∑
t
ω˜kt = ρ˜t˜ω
where ρ˜ is the unknown inflation parameter we need to determine and t˜ω denotes
the total observed labor compensation. We denote total revenues tr and total
intermediate materials tm. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) suggest that the ratio of
total wage payments to value-added is roughly 50% from the Chinese national
accounts and input-output tables. This implies that
tω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒
ρ˜t˜ω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒ ρ˜ = 0.5
tr − tm
t˜ω
After ρ˜ is determined, we calculate the labor share in each of exporting industries
we focus on as:
αl =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜ω˜kt
r˜kt
where r˜kt are the firm k’s nominal revenues, and N˜ is the total number of firm
observations in each year. Similarly, we calculate the intermediate materials share
as the average share of intermediate inputs in total revenues,
αm =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜m˜kt
r˜kt
where m˜kt is the total value of intermediate materials firm k used in year t. Finally,
in the absence of reliable capital share information, we follow Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and assume constant returns to scale so that αk = 1 − αl − αm. We have
alternatively tried estimating the input shares, and productivity, using control
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function methods (De Loecker et al., 2012). We find very similar measures of
input shares and productivity.
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Appendix (For Reviewer)
The labor demand of a pure domestic firm with productivity φk is given by
lnei (ω, φk) =
qi
φk
qi = Ap
−σ
i
pi =
σ
σ − 1
(
ω
φk
)
⇒ lnei (ω, φk) = Ai
(
1
φk
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
ω−σ (A1)
The ETR system refunds the pure exporting firms according to their export
revenues: ti
τ
p∗vq
∗
v , where p
∗
v = τ
σ
σ−1
ω
φv
, and q∗v = A
∗
i (p
∗
v)
−σ. However, the incomplete
ETR system in China only partially refunds most exporting firms, which makes
the non-rebatable part, r− τ˜2 (r is the official tax collection rate), an effective tax
on exports. The pure exporting firm’s optimization problem becomes:
max
p∗v
(
p∗v − τ
ω
φv
)(
A∗i p
∗−σ
v
)− 1
τ
p∗v · A∗i p∗−σv (r − ti)
⇒ p∗v =
σ
σ − 1
(
τ˜
ω
φv
)
(A2)
where, τ˜ =
τ(
1 + τ2
τ
σ
) 1
σ−1
, τ2 = r − ti
From equation (A2), the optimal quantity and the corresponding labor demand
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for foreign markets are as follows:
q∗v = A
∗
i (p
∗
v)
−σ
= A∗i
[
σ
σ − 1
(
τ˜
ω
φv
)]−σ
⇒ lei (ω, φv, ti) = A∗
(
1
φv
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ (A3)
To show the inequality of (9.4), we only need to show the opposite is impossible.
Assume ∂ω
∂ti
< 0.This implies the following inequality:
∂L
∂ti
=
∑
k
(
∂lnei (ω, φk)
∂ω
∂ω
∂ti
)
+
∑
v
(
∂lei (ω, φv,ti)
∂ω
∂ω
∂ti
+
∂lei (ω, φv, ti)
∂ti
)
+
∑
n6=i
[∑
k
(
∂lnen (ω, φk)
∂ω
∂ω
∂ti
)
+
∑
v
(
∂lek(ω, φv, tn)
∂ω
∂ω
∂ti
)]
> 0
⇒ ∂L
∂ti
> 0
⇒ ∂ (a+ bω)
∂ti
> 0
⇒ ∂ω
∂ti
> 0 (A4)
The second inequality is because of the equilibrium, L = a + bω (Labor market
clearing). The last inequality is a contradiction, therefore, we have proved inequal-
ity (9.4).
26
The impact of the ETR change in industry i on the regional wage is as follows:
b
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti =
∂L
∂ti
∆ti
=
∑
j
[∑
k
(
∂lnej (ω, φk)
∂ω
)
+
∑
v
(
∂lej(ω, φv,tj)
∂ω
)]
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti +
∑
v
∂lei (ω, φv, ti)
∂ti
∆ti
=
∑
j
−σ
ω
[∑
k
lnej (ω, φk) +
∑
v
lej(ω, φv,ti)
]
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti +
∑
v
lei (ω, φv, ti) (−σ) τ˜
∂τ˜
∂ti
∆ti
=
(∑
j
−σ
ω
Lj
)
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti + L
e
i (−σ) τ˜
∂τ˜
∂ti
∆ti
⇒ ∂ω
∂ti
∆ti =
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti∆ti
b+
∑
j
−σ
ω
Lj
(A5)
where Lei is the total labor demand for pure exporting firms in industry i, and Lj
is the total labor demand in industry j. The third equation is derived as follows:
∂lnej (ω, φk)
∂ω
=
−σ
ω
lnej (ω, φk) (A5.1)
∂lej(ω, φv, tj)
∂ω
=
−σ
ω
lej(ω, φv, tj) (A5.2)
∂lei (ω, φv, ti)
∂ti
= A∗i
(
1
φv
)1−σ (
σi
σi − 1
)−σ
(ω)−σ (−σi) τ˜−σ−1 ∂τ˜
∂ti
= A∗
(
1
φv
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜
∂ti
= lei (ω, φv, ti) (−σ) τ˜
∂τ˜
∂ti
(A5.3)
From (A5), we can derive the impact of ETR changes in all industries on the
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regional wage:
∆ω =
∑
i
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti
=
∑
i
Lei (−σi) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
b+
∑
j
−σj
ω
Lj
∆ti
=
∑
i
βi∆ti (A6)
where βi =
Lei (−σi) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
b+
∑
j
−σj
ω
Lj
Define αi =
Lei∑
j Lj
, the share of labors in industry i for exporting production.
If σi, the substitution elasticity, is not correlated with Li, nor L
e
i , αi and βi is
positively correlated.
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